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ABSTRACT
Certifying Computer Forensics Skills
Michael Charles Watson
School of Technology, BYU
Master of Science
Computer forensics is an ever-growing technological field of complexity and depth.
Individuals must strive to keep learning and growing their skills as they help combat cybercrime
throughout the world. This study attempts to establish a method of evaluating conceptual
expertise in computer forensics to help indicate whether or not an individual understands the five
basic phases of computer forensics: preparation, seizure of evidence, acquisition of data, analysis
of data, and reporting the findings of the analysis.
A survey was presented to a university class of 30 students taking a computer forensics
course and as well as posted online asking computer forensics professionals to participate in the
survey. Results show that novices that were enrolled in a computer forensics course were able to
identify the phases of computer forensics more readily than professionals.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Who Are Computer Forensics Analysts?
Computer forensics analysts combine their technical skills with their forensic aptitude to
recover information from computers and storage devices. They often assist law enforcement
officers with cybercrimes in the retrieval process of digital evidence and to present findings in
court. Computer forensics analysts also work with organizations when dealing with corporate
espionage, misuse of corporate information, potential loss of data, and other potential hacking
incidents (Marcella, J. & Greenfield, 2002).
Computer forensics analysts require developed problem-solving skills, knowledge of
operating systems, data storage, network communications, and knowledge of cybersecurity
principles. They often possess the aptitude and awareness of how hackers operate in order to
assist them in finding hacking activity, entry and exit points on the network, and other methods
and tools hackers may use in stealing data or denying service. In addition, they need to know
how to legally seize computers and storage devices in order to acquire data from these devices
that may be helpful in a case. Analysts then search for digital evidence on these devices while
utilizing different pieces of software to create a story. During this process, they have to
demonstrate that they were able to acquire the data in a repeatable fashion that would hold up in
a legal court. (Marcella, J. & Greenfield, 2002).
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The Phases of Computer Forensics
The stages or phases of computer forensics is vital for a professional to know and
understand. If a professional does not follow a strict methodology, they can invalidate all the
work they have completed. The computer forensics stages in this thesis are grouped into five
separate phases: preparation, seizure of evidence, acquisition of data, analysis of data and
reporting the findings of analysis.
The preparation stage features all the tasks and activities that are performed before an
investigation or case is accepted by a Computer forensics professional. This is to ensure that the
professional has the equipment, skills, environment and whatever else they may need in the
course of their work. Examples of this would be preparing a laboratory for an upcoming client or
to learn different skills that would be useful while performing any process a computer forensics
professional would find themselves required to do.
The seizure stage is obtaining the physical or digital evidence. Computer forensics
professionals are often required to obtain evidence in such a way that would be admissible in
court to show that it had not been tampered with. The main objective here is to show that the
evidence of each case has not been altered or damaged in any way throughout the process and to
prepare it for the data acquisition stage. Examples of this would be physically taking evidence
into their possession or filling out a chain of custody form.
The acquisition stage is collecting evidence off the devices that were collected. When
acquiring the data, a computer forensics professional is now getting the data they obtained and
getting it ready to be analyzed. This could be jailbreaking a device or using a script to image (or
duplicate) a web server. Often the acquisition stage is getting data off the original devices onto
devices that the data can be analyzed on. One step in this stage is to run the original data through
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an encryption algorithm to produce a unique hash, or a value that is produced using a one-way
mathematical function. Then, when the data is collected onto a different drive, the professional
will run that device through the same algorithm to produce the same hash to show that the new
device they are using for their analysis is identical.
The analysis stage is where most of a professional’s technical skills, knowledge and
abilities will be used. As can be inferred from the title of the stage, a professional will now
analyze the data that has been seized and acquired. They will look for evidence of the crime that
a criminal is being charged with. One thing a professional will perform in this stage is file
carving, which is searching through a file system for a specific type of file or search term. They
will look for evidence of obfuscation such steganography or for discrepancies throughout the
whole file system..
The reporting stage is putting together all the steps the professional has performed up to
this point, provide professional opinion on what the evidence may or may not suggest and
prepare a digital and physical copy for the Court (or organization) to use in determining guilt.
Professionals often give testimony in a court case and explain their findings so that a judge or
jury may understand the technical nuances and meanings of what is being presented.

The Study
Assessing an individual’s computer forensics skills and understanding of the field is vital
to organizations. Recent advancements in measurements of conceptual expertise utilized in
computer security (Giboney et al. 2016) will be used to measure computer forensics skills. They
showed that professionals can recognize fundamental principles more easily than novices and
utilized a technique to quickly measure the difference between novices and experts. Following
3

their guidelines, we propose to do the same for computer forensics expertise with the following
research question: Can it be determined if a professional has more conceptual expertise than
students by grouping like scenarios into the phase of computer forensics the scenario is
performed in?
To answer this question, we will use different tasks cited from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) publication 800-181, National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (Newhouse et al., 2016). This framework
provides an interdisciplinary reference structure for different tasks, aspects of cybersecurity
knowledge, skills, and abilities (TKSAs) that can be applied to computer forensics. Using the
TKSAs we will follow scale established development procedures to develop a survey to assess
conceptual expertise. The steps are as follows: 1) conceptualization, 2) development of
measures, 3) model specification, 4) scale evaluation and refinement, 5) validation, and 6) norm
development (MacKenzie et al., 2011).
The results of this survey assess the depth and breadth of their understanding of the
different computer forensics phases. This survey was given to IT students who had just taken and
professionals I hypothesize that students and professionals will show differing competencies and
understanding of the NIST knowledge points. I expect that professionals are able to easily
identify the processes and steps of the computer forensics cycle and that students will only have
a theoretical understanding of computer forensics and will score lower.

4
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LITERATURE REVIEW

What is Conceptual Expertise?
This study is based off of a previous experiment performed to measure conceptual
expertise in hackers. The project used the Security Expertise Assessment Measure (SEAM)
which is a process that aims to, in part, gauge the practical application of situations to the goal
wherein experts can show those skills they acquired and became proficient at (Giboney et al.,
2016). This is measured in conceptual expertise and is meant to differ novices from experts in
cybersecurity. Those who show proficiency with the different skills, knowledge and abilities will
group different scenarios together in conceptual tasks to demonstrate thorough understanding of
the fundamental processes of cybersecurity. Those who have not practiced nor “cognitively
processed” not demonstrate that in the expertise in the SEAM process by pairings scenarios that
have similar features but are not based on fundamental principles of cyber security.
This survey successfully proved that professionals had a thorough understanding of cyber
security principles while students and self-proclaimed hackers had a superficial understanding
(Giboney et al., 2016). In a similar way, the study aimed to construct a survey that would be
able to assess the varying skills of computer forensics professionals and students to show the
differences in understanding of computer forensics skills and principals.
The measures used to score the proficiency of survey takers was constructed in a manner
following the methodology as outlined by MacKenzie, Podsakoff and Podsakoff (2011). This
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process goes through five major steps: conceptualization, development of measures, model
specification, scale evaluation and refinement, and validation.
As this process is adopted into this study, computer forensics conceptual expertise will
demonstrate that an individual can understand the fundamentals of the computer forensics
process. This conceptual expertise is demonstrated through pairing scenarios through surface
features, deep features, or unexpected features.
A surface feature would be an object or context represented in a problem. These features
are more “surface level” understanding of computer forensics. In the case of this study, surface
features will be represented as a type of crime featured in a scenario. The types of crimes that
can be paired in scenarios are fraud, murder, drug related, vandalism, and theft. If an individual
pairs two scenarios based on surface features, then that demonstrates surface level knowledge.
Deep features are the underlying principles that demonstrate understanding in a certain
area. They answer the “Why?” behind an action and focus on the big picture and the fundamental
principles of computer forensics. In this experiment, we will use the five phases of computer
forensics mentioned previously. Computer forensics is a profession that has to follow a strict
methodology, or they can invalidate their results and work. With that in mind, the scenarios used
are based on tasks listed in the NIST 800-181 publication. These generated scenarios contain a
situation that involves only one phase of computer forensics, which if identified will demonstrate
an individual’s conceptual expertise.
Unexpected features are pairings of scenarios that do not belong to a surface feature or a
deep feature. These pairings would feature scenario pairings that contain different types of
crimes and/or different phases of computer forensics. For example, a pairing could have a drug
related scenario with a vandalism scenario or a preparation scenario with a reporting scenario.
6

Skills Required of a Computer Forensics Professional
Computer forensics relies on expertise, computer self-efficacy and a structured and
repeatable process to bring about the same results. Bandura (1986) defines self-efficacy as
“People’s judgements of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to
attain designated types of performances. It is concerned not with the skills one has but with
judgments of what once (sic) can do with whatever skills one possesses (p. 391).”
As a computer forensics analyst, one must judge how to approach many different
situations. Being able to have confidence to accurately judge a situation is a necessary quality to
be an expert. Self-efficacy has three dimensions: magnitude, strength, generalizability. The
magnitude of self-efficacy is the measure of being able to accomplish more difficult tasks.
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995). Strength refers to the confidence in being able to complete
designated tasks. Generalizability is the extent to which a person believes they can accomplish a
task but only under certain circumstances. A computer forensics analyst will find themselves in
many kinds of situations without being able to control what tasks must be performed.
Not only does a computer forensics analyst need to know how to judge a situation, they
need to demonstrate proficient computer ability. There are many types of devices a computer
forensics analyst will come into contact with: cell phones, laptops, security cameras, smart
devices, etc. Being able to know how to use each one (and their variance) is vital in acquiring the
proper information for an investigation (Cheney & Nelson, 1997). As technology develops and
progresses, so does a computer forensics analyst’s skills and knowledge must adapt and improve
as well.
The ability to assess a computer forensics professional’s skill has become increasingly
difficult as the digital crimes committed have become more complex, varied, and frequent. The
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professional has to keep up with the ever-evolving methodology, technology, tactics, and
procedures of malicious actors to try to stay one step ahead of them (Horsman, 2017).
Some have even argued that digital crimes have become impossible to police due to the
legal system not being able to stay abreast with digital crime (Brown, 2015). If digital crimes are
impossible to enforce the law on, it would be less of a necessity to have computer forensics
analysts on staff or at the ready. Brown sought to raise awareness about cybercrime and many of
the loopholes they find to escape prosecution. Digital criminals can violate several countries’
laws at a time while living in a place that does not police digital crime. For example, a Russian
native can hack into a United States bank and most likely not receive any consequences. Russian
law concerning cybercrime is lax and it would be impossible to extradite a citizen for any crimes
committed in the United States (IntSights Exposes Dark Side of Russia at Black Hat U.S.A,
2021). If there are no legal ramifications for a digital crime, then how would a computer
forensics professional thrive? Fortunately computer forensics will still be expanded and
continued while the legal system slowly catches it policies, practices and procedures up-to-date
with current cybercrimes (Horsman, 2017).
Computer forensics professionals need to acquire skills to recognize, combat, and
counter cyber criminals (Barske et al., 2010). They need to know how to identify vulnerabilities,
exploits, obfuscation techniques, and other signs of illicit activity. They also must perform all of
the following functions:
-

Ensure that there is proper legal authority to conduct the search and examination

-

Ensure that the correct chain of custody is kept for the evidence

-

Only use forensic tools that have been validated

-

The use of imaging and hashing functions to acquire evidence
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-

The examination and analysis of the evidence

-

Quality assurance to ensure that the examination and analysis, and the results thereof,
are repeatable by another examiner

-

Reporting of the findings

-

Possible testifying as an expert witness in legal proceedings (Barske et al., 2010).

This requires legal knowledge of digital evidence requirements, how to preserve
evidence, know how to use a variety of different digital tools, analyze and report their findings.
Professionals must follow a cycle of maintaining up-to-date knowledge of strategies, policies and
procedures, technology, computer forensics (referenced here as digital forensics) response
methods, and compliance and monitoring to stay relevant. Technology and the skills required to
perform computer forensics are increasing at a rapid rate and professionals have to do everything
they can to not be left behind (Horsman, 2017).

Figure 2.2: Maintaining Computer Forensics Readiness (Barske et al., 2010)

Compare the kind of cell phones that were available ten years ago. Smart phones were
just introduced by Apple through the production of the iPhone and only a few individuals
9

possessed them. Today, ninety-seven percent of Adults in the United States of America own a
cell phone and eighty-five percent own at least one smartphone devices (Center, 2021).
Computer forensics policies have had to adapt to not only focus on modern computers and
servers but extend to mobile devices as well. Mobile devices now carry as much information (or
even more than) as personal computers such as GPS, email, texting, work communications and
much more. Computer forensics professionals must know how each of these relatively new types
of data on cell phone function. Wireless technologies have allowed individuals to have access to
the internet in most places. Professionals must consider different standards of wireless
communication and weaknesses associated with them.
To keep up with these ever evolving and changing cyber criminals, computer forensics
professionals must keep learning and evolving their skills.

Learning Computer Forensics
There have been attempts to establish an education agenda to create a standard to
evaluate computer forensics examiners. One attempt has been to create different education
models to satisfy different needs such as legal examiners, military, law enforcement and
corporations (Nance et al., 2010). They identified seven different communities that have unique
computer forensics needs: law enforcement, expert witnesses, legal profession, policymakers and
legislators, corporations, community, and higher education.
Law enforcement officers require knowledge about different computer forensic skills,
the strict regulations revolving around digital evidence, and proven, repeatable procedural
methods. The main stage of computer forensics that they need to be proficient in, is the seizure
of evidence so that they do not accidentally tamper with the evidence. First responders need to
not only recognize potential digital evidence, but also do not harm the evidence while
10

investigating it. Computer forensics analysts often have immense workloads and may not keep
up with current technology so they need a set of standard procedures that will be valid for a wide
variety of situations (Horsman, 2017). Law enforcement has to follow strict regulations as to
help keep the legal system fair and equal. To do this, they must use repeatable, procedural
methods to show that evidence has not been tampered with and that their findings are not skewed
to defame or misrepresent a potential criminal.
Expert witnesses need to take digital evidence, evaluate the process the evidence went
through and testify in court about it. Expert witnesses are individuals that the court uses to testify
about technical details of a case to help those in the case to understand what the evidence means.
They need to use specialized software and have enough experience and understanding of the
computer forensics process to make sure that they are an impartial opinion and to not harm the
evidence. They must ensure that the original data matches with what prosecutors or defense
attorneys may show in court. These experts have to help non-technical individuals to understand
what the cyber evidence shows and what it does not. Many individuals do not have a thorough
understanding of how technology functions and these experts must be versed well enough to
elaborate, translate and simplify digital findings to help those in a court to understand and
determine if the evidence is viable.
The legal profession is an interesting community when it comes to computer forensics.
Members in this community do not necessarily need to have the technical skills to process the
evidence and find the evidence, but they do need to know what the process should be so that they
can to understand if the evidence is viable in court.
Another group of individuals that need understanding of computer forensics are
policymakers and legislators. Many of the individuals that are responsible for making laws and

11

policies relating to computer forensics come from a political or business background and may
not understand the processes or even the technology relating to computer forensics. These
individuals do not need to know the technical details and procedures, but they do need to know
the limitations of what can be done and what evidence can be shown. Being able to create laws
and policies that coincide with understanding of computer forensics technology will enable and
protect the public, law enforcers and everyone who interacts with a digital device.
Businesses often require the aid of computer forensics analysts. They are subject to
compliance laws and other regulations. These individuals need to identify and respond to cyber
security incidents quickly and efficiently. Many incidents are time sensitive and early on need to
be determined if law enforcement involvement is necessary. Regulations often have time
requirements on reporting security breaches and a competent computer forensics analyst will
discern what information has been possibly divulged and the possible need for reporting to
regulation offices. Business cyber security professionals need to be proactive and seek out
possible breaches within their corporation. These individuals often focus on the remediation side
of computer forensics so that the problem can be remedied in a timely manner. This requires
hands-on knowledge, experience, and deep understanding of technical processes.
The sixth identified group in this research (Nance et al., 2010) is the community which
includes children and adults alike. Community members that have a basic understanding of how
to keep themselves safe from a cyber security incident can act on minimizing the threat of digital
crime. A population that is resistant to digital crime would provide a safer digital environment
and a deeper understanding of how their information is used and how they can protect it.
The last identified group is Higher Education which consists of community colleges,
undergraduate programs, graduate programs, technical programs, and educators. These
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environments are an essential role in computer forensics for members of this community.
Educators in this sector are the ones that prepare and train budding cyber security professionals.
Educators need to be aware of the six different communities and to which community needs they
are trying to prepare their students for. Educators may differ from professionals as they often
focus on research, but as they teach to each student’s needs, they can prepare them for the handson and experiential learning while the students are in a classroom.
Due to the vast differences between each community, an education agenda would help
prepare students and individuals to enter and excel into the computer forensics field. Nance,
Armstrong, & Armstrong (2010) found that by sorting students out into different categories
according to their communities, they could more accurately teach to each group’s varying
computer forensics requirements for their profession. They also found that mixing two
communities together often resulted in an experience where each community can teach each
other some of the specialties that their community focuses on.
Various higher education institutions have established their own focuses. At Cypress
College, they focus on practical skills while Florida A&M University tries to do a crossdisciplinary concentration with Sociology and Criminal Justice (Chi et al., 2010; Wassenaar et
al., 2009). This study created an undergraduate certificate program that tried to balance
theoretical and practical with a set of 2 types of classes, basic and advanced. Each had a practical
lab associated with it (Lang et al., 2014). These courses and labs were designed to give students
the hands-on experience with computer forensics mixed with the cyber forensics process to
prepare them for computer forensics careers right out of university. They ran two pilot courses
with computer science students and law students. Each group had varying degrees of success.
The first class they found to be too technically heavy for the law students. They adjusted the
13

second class and focused on the investigation process. They found that the second class was able
to reach their intended goal of teaching the cyber forensics process and giving students technical
training. The computer science students were teamed up with the law students on mock
investigations as a project. Together they were able to provide specialization and simulate the
entire computer forensics process. Both studies were able to learn from each other and reported
that their learning was enriched by interacting with other majors.

Professional Certifications
Most professionals demonstrate expertise through the acquisition of different professional
certifications. Certifications, however, cannot always be a valid judge of skills. Because
certifications are mostly focused on taking written and applicable tests, some people will commit
the facts or principles necessary for the test to short-term memory and will forget them shortly
thereafter (Rawson et al., 2013). Once someone takes a certification, they can renew it through
Continuing Professional Education (CPE) credits. The CPE program was designed to meet the
learning needs of professionals in many different fields (Cervero, 2001). As early as 1980
academics have been talking about the need for continuing professional education. In that
decade, many such articles, proposals and books were written to convince corporations that the
workforce needed to keep up to date with current knowledge, skills, and abilities to stay abreast
in their fields (Houle, 1980).
Technology certifications go through a rigorous process to attempt to meet the highest
standards set by overarching organizations such as the International Standards Organization
(ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Individuals have to study, learn, and
know many different things.
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Depending on the certification, CPE credits can be earned in various ways like taking
classes and attending conferences ((ISC)2, 2020). While some CPE credits can enhance the skill
and learning of a certification, the credits earned do not necessarily have to be related to the
certificate an individual is renewing. For example, an option to maintain the Certified
Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certificate requires forty hours a year of
domain-related activities, which “relate directly to activities in the areas covered by the specific
domains of the respective credential.” Ten of those credits each year can be related to nondomain related professional development. However, the CISSP covers eight different domains:
Risk Assurance, Asset Security, Security Architecture and Engineering, Communications and
Network Security, Identity and Access Management, Security Assessment and Testing, Security
Operations, and Software Development Security.
While these all relate to cyber security field, each domain by itself is a profession that
one could spend a lifetime learning and perfecting. To be compliant with the requirements of
maintaining the CISSP, an individual could spend years acquiring their CPE credits by choosing
to focus on just one of these domains. Also, the CISSP was introduced in 1994, when technology
was vastly different. Hard drives were around 400 MB while today’s digital storage is usually
measured in hundreds of terabytes. This means that a professional who did not keep up to date on
all the various principles found in the CISSP exam, they would not know how to practice those
principles ten or even fifteen years later in their career.
Therefore, merely by acquiring CPE credits can lead to gaps in a cyber security
professional’s understanding. It may be difficult to determine if that individual still has those
acquired knowledge, skills, and principles from a specific certification from the time when they
passed the test for the certification.
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Unfortunately, individuals do not always keep up the skills they learned and certifications
they hold cannot always be a proof that the holder can pass the certification again if they must.
Thus, the renewal of a computer forensics certificate through CPE credits could possibly not be
an accurate representation of the actual skill that the certificate holder has in the Computer
Forensics field and can create difficulties for hiring managers and others wishing to assess
computer forensic skill and understanding.
Due to the current inability to accurately measure an individual’s skills and understanding
of computer forensics principles quickly, this thesis and study investigates how to measure those
principles in professionals and novices to add some value into the process of evaluating a
professional’s understanding of computer forensics principles.
There are quite a few variations of computer forensics certifications (Imam, 2019). These
are some examples in Table 2.4:
Table 2.4 Example Certifications and Their Publisher
Acronym
ACE
CFCE
CHFI
EnCe
GCFA
GCFE

Name of Certificate
AccessData Certified
Examiner
Certified Forensic Computer
Examiner
Computer Hacking Forensic
Investigator
EnCase Certified Examiner
GIAC Certified Forensic
Analyst
GIAC Certified Forensic
Examiner

Publishing Organization
AccessData
IACIS
EC_Council
EnCase
GIAC
GIAC

Most of these certifications are tied to a specific vendor, application, or operating system.
Researchers Rogers and Seigfried said back in 2004,
16

“To date, computer forensics has been primarily driven by vendors and applied
technologies with very little consideration being given to establishing sound theoretical
foundation” (Rogers & Seigfried, 2004).
These researchers also talk about how the judicial system had started to question the validity of
many computer forensics procedures. The Supreme Court in Daubert vs Merrell provided
specific criteria to rule on the admissibility of scientific evidence:
-

whether the theory or technique has been reliably tested;

-

whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication;

-

what is known or potential rate of error of the method used; and

-

whether the theory or method has been generally accepted by the scientific community.
Computer forensics certifications attempt to live up to a standard set by the international

groups, the International Standards Organization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). They have established a technical committee that have demonstrated
mastery, competence, and years of experience to help establish guidelines, policies, and bars of
expectations that certifications must meet.
Many of the certifications requested in current computer forensics job postings stem from
these companies, GIAC, (ISC)2, IACIS, and the EC-Council. These groups have a wide variety
of certifications ranging from entry level computer forensics to elite level programs where less
than 300 individuals worldwide have demonstrated abilities to pass their certification tests.

Retaining Skills
It is common for people to forget knowledge and skills without incorporating them into
daily life. Such as cramming for exams the night before, people often forget the information they
17

rushed to learn and remember (Rawson et al., 2013). The same applies with technology
certifications. One must practice the same skills they learned for the certification test
continuously to convert them to long-term memory. “Cognitive processes play a prominent role
in the acquisition and retention of new behavior patterns” (Bandura, 1977). These behavior
patterns reflect how the mind stores long-term memories. When individuals practice their skills
they are better retained.
If the individuals who obtained these exams earned their Continuing Professional
Education credits relating to computer forensics and continue to gain expertise in the field, then
they should to retain their skills, abilities, and areas of knowledge that they gained and proved in
the certifications. However, as discussed in the introduction, Continuing Professional Education
credits do not always have to be related directly to their area of expertise. These are what
Continuing Professional Education credits are supposed to emulate and encourage professionals
to keep developing their skills, knowledge, and ability. While NIST 800-181 (Newhouse et al.,
2016) does not advance as quickly as technology does, it does lay out the foundational and basic
skills required for IT professionals. Basing the hypothesis of this thesis on these foundational
principles will help keep the survey scenarios developed to be technology agnostic and apply to
all situations a computer forensics professional may encounter. The conceptual expertise will
gauge the fundamentals these professionals understand. Experts will perform and understand
computer forensics tasks superior to novices as they have practical experience and time to
solidify their knowledge in their field.
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3

METHODOLOGY AND COLLECTION OF DATA

Development of Measures and Testing
As computer forensics is on the defensive side of cyber security, the SEAM process
could be useful as it is a similar application, just directed at a different audience. A computer
forensics analyst needs to know hacking methods and motivations. If they are familiar with a
hacker’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, then they can perform their job more effectively
(Voiskounsky & Smyslova, 2003). Giboney (2016) discusses the benefits of a study with a
survey over a qualitative experiment. As this study can assign a quantitative value to a qualitative
result, one can start to measure expertise on a numerical scale.
Computer forensics expertise is similar to hacking. Knowing how to circumvent security
controls and vulnerabilities will help them track down attack vectors and methods hackers
commonly use to infiltrate systems. They can also demonstrate proficiency by their knowledge
of file systems, how file permissions and read/write procedures of different operating systems,
knowledge of finding hidden or obfuscated files and how to prepare evidence to stand in a legal
court. Survey takers will be measured against their knowledge of these kinds of principles. Since
NIST standards are accepted by the government and are often applied to data policies and
government work, it seems that this would be a good document on which to base the assessment.
The measures in this survey will be based on principles from a publication of standards
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST 800-181 (Newhouse et al., 2016).
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While the ISO and the IEC have international standards, they can be a bit general. These
standards by NIST are specific technological skills and knowledge points that have been laid out.
Relevant tasks from this guide will be grouped according to their relations to computer forensics
phases and stages. As participants correctly classify different tasks, then the depth of their
knowledge and ability can be assessed according to the skills required to perform each task that
the survey taker has learned about or used previously.
The surface feature categories have five different crimes involved in their situations:
murder, drug-related crimes, fraud, theft, and vandalism. The deep feature categories consist of
the five stages of computer forensics: preparation, seizure of evidence, acquisition of data,
analysis of data and reporting the findings of analysis. Twenty-five scenarios, using an
alphabetical list, will be created featuring one surface feature and one deep feature each.
This process is visually depicted in table 3.1. Situations in vertical columns are related
deep features in each process stage of computer forensics. Situations in horizontal rows are
related surface features which are grouped by crime. Each letter is a corresponds to a scenario
given on the survey.
Table 3.1: Correlation of Surface and Deep Features

Hypothesized
Surface Features

Preparation

Hypothesized Deep Features
Seizure Acquisition Analysis

Reporting

Theft

X

L

E

S

O

Vandalism
Murder
Drug
Related
Fraud

J
M

G
C

Q
U

V
I

B
Y

D

T

W

A

R

P

H

K

N

F
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Mapping Scenarios to TKSA Points From NIST
In order to build the scenarios off technical standards, five principles from each stage of
computer forensics were selected. Each principle is directly correlated to a Task, Knowledge
Point, Skill or Ability (TKSA) outlined in the National Institute of Standards and Technology
800-181 (Newhouse et al., 2016). This allows for these situations to be based on a nationally
accepted list of standards. Due to the situations being task oriented, most of the principles are
based on expected tasks of a computer forensics professional over the skills, knowledge and
abilities listed in the document.
The twenty-five scenarios are split into five groups where five scenarios are correlated
with each computer forensics stage of the process. Most of the situations are directly related to a
principle while others are based on the fundamental point of the principle.
Table 3.2-1: TKSA Principles Outlined by Computer Forensics Process
Preparation

Principle

Principle A
Principle B

Examine Network Topologies to understand data flows through the network (pg. 11)
Write Standard Operating Procedures (T0247)

Principle C

Acquire and maintain a working knowledge of constitutional issues which arise in
relevant laws, regulations, policies, agreements, standards, procedures or other
issuances (T0419)
Employ IT systems and digital storage media to solve investigate and/or prosecute
cybercrimes and fraud (T0479)
Determine tactics techniques and procedures (TTPs) for intrusion sets (T290)

Principle D
Principle E

Seizure

Principle

Principle A

Ensure that chain of custody is followed for all digital media acquired in accordance
with the federal rules of evidence (T0087)

Principle B

Capture and analyze network traffic associated with malicious activities using network
monitoring tools. (T0240)
Document original condition of digital and/or associated evidence (via digital photos,
written reports, hash function checking (T0471)
Adjust collection operations or collection plan to address identified issues/challenges
and to synchronize collections with overall operational requirements (T0562)

Principle C
Principle D
Principle E

Apply and obey applicable statutes, laws, regulations and policies (T0574)
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Table 3.2-1: Continued
Acquisition

Principle

Principle A
Principle B

Extract data using data carving techniques (T0238)
Use specialized equipment and techniques to catalog, document, extract, collect,
package, and preserve digital evidence (T0241)

Principle C
Principle D

Utilize different programing languages to write code, open files, read files and write
output to different files (T0404)
Decrypt seized data using technical means (T0049)

Principle E

Create a forensically sound duplicate of evidence (T0048)

Principle A

Characterize and analyze network traffic to identify anomalous activity and potential
threats (T0023)
Conduct analysis of log files, evidence, and other info to determine best methods of
identifying perp(s) of a network intrusion (T0027)
Assess threats to and vulnerabilities of computer system(s) to develop a security risk
profile (T0019)
Analyze identified malicious activity to determine weaknesses exploited, exploitation
methods, effects on system and information (T0260)
Detect and analyze encrypted data, stenography, alternate data streams and other forms
of concealed data (T0439)

Analysis

Principle B
Principle C
Principle D
Principle E

Reporting
Principle A
Principle B
Principle C
Principle D
Principle E

Principle

Principle

Present technical information to technical and nontechnical audiences (T0381)
Correlate incident data to identify specific vulnerabilities and make recommendations
that enable expeditious remediation (T0047)
Identify and/or determine whether a security incident is indicative of a violation of law
that requires specific legal actions (T0110)
Prepare legal and other relevant documents (T0522)
Assess the validity of source data and subsequent findings. (T0347)

These situations focus on a gender-neutral individual named Jordan. In the survey it
describes the actions they perform when completing common computer forensics duties. The
situations are singular sentences stating what Jordan does in a single task. The sentence structure
has been varied as to prevent any type of pattern that survey takers could use to fill out the
assessment without understanding either the surface or deep features. The sentence either
positions the type of crime first in the sentence or the forensic task first. An example of these
differences would be “Jordan recovers a laptop discovered at the scene of a drug bust and Jordan
goes to the scene of a drug bust to recover a laptop.”
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This variation is to help differentiate which is featured first, the surface and deep features
of a situation. The surface feature in this case would be that this crime involves drugs while the
deep feature is recovering the laptop. Recovering the laptop would fit into the Acquisition phase
of the computer forensics process. The goal is to have survey takers understand which phase of
the computer forensics cycle the situation would fit into and not to use patterns or other methods
to discern how the groupings should be made.
All situations were randomly assigned a position in the survey by using a random number
generator. Twelve of the situations are phrased with the crime category first with the other
thirteen starting with the forensics category first. Survey takers will be asked to group the
situations by stage of forensics or by what crime the task is involved with. At the end of the
survey, participants will also enter in how many years of experience and their current job role so
that their results can be compared with their peers.
Apart from the surface features and deep features, there are many other ways to group
each situation that could not be predetermined. If a situation is not within a deep or surface
feature, it will be labeled as an unexpected feature and be scored differently to provide context
for answers that don’t fall into any of the expected categories.
To ensure that the scenarios were correctly attributed to the computer forensics stage they
belonged to, a group of 15 IT students that had taken a computer forensics course were asked to
rate each situation. They were asked to rate the situation on a scale of 1 – 5 of how well the
situation fit inside the preparation, seizure, acquisition, analyzing and reporting stages, with 5
being a perfect fit. An example of this survey is represented by Figure 3.2-1 and the situations
that were initially evaluated can be found in Table 3.2-2.
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Figure 3.2-1: Assessment Rated by Students
The survey also provided a space for the responders to leave comments about the
situations and if any steps were unclear to them. Responders were able to leave specific
comments that were able to help improve the situations for future use. The comments, combined
with the numerical results, were used to acknowledge where some situations may have been
ambiguous to what phase they may have belonged to and refine the situations to be plain and
straightforward about which computer forensics phase they belonged to.
If a given situation had a majority of responses correct, then the situation was then
deemed that it would work for the survey and was kept as it was written. If a given situation’s
responses seemed to be confusing for the survey takers, the scenarios were reviewed to see why
the proper category wasn’t apparent in the situation. Six of the twenty-five situations were
required to be tuned as the majority of response rates had put them into an incorrect category.
These situations were then clarified so that the phase it belonged to would be apparent. Doing so
would help the survey be more concise and make sure that the options presented would be fully
focused on the correct surface and deep features.
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Table 3.2-2: Initial Situations
Hypothesized Surface
Feature
Drug Related

Hypothesized
Deep Feature
Analysis

Vandalism

Reporting

Murder

Seizure

Drug Related

Preparation

Theft

Acquisition

Fraud

Reporting

Vandalism

Seizure

Fraud

Seizure

Murder
Vandalism

Analysis
Preparation

Fraud

Acquisition

Theft

Seizure

Murder

Preparation

Fraud

Analysis

Theft

Reporting

Fraud

Preparation

Vandalism
Drug Related

Acquisition
Reporting

Theft

Analysis

Drug Related
Murder

Seizure
Acquisition

Vandalism

Analysis

Drug Related
Theft

Acquisition
Preparation

Murder

Reporting

Situation
Jordan looks through texts from a seized phone searching for
evidence of drug meetups.
Jordan summarizes the important information about a hacked web
page for technical and non-technical audiences.
Jordan starts a chain of custody form for a phone found at a murder
scene.
Jordan buys supplies such as faraday bags to be able to store devices
for an upcoming drug raid.
Jordan uses a write blocker to copy a hard drive brought to the
forensics lab from a robbery case.
Jordan writes an assessment about data related to a bank fraud.
Jordan captures the router connected to a hacker’s computer that
vandalized a website.
Jordan records network traffic of a hacker’s computer that vandalized
a website.
Jordan uses file carving to investigate a murder suspect’s computer.
Jordan learns hacking methods in preparation to access data on a
graffiti artist’s device.
Jordan obtains warrants for devices that may have been used by
money launderers.
Jordan takes a photo at a crime scene of a hard drive that contains
stolen company secrets
Jordan reads newly released legal proceedings from a murder case
that used digital forensics.
Jordan identifies discrepancies in the financial books and data from a
bank’s server logs.
Jordan shows the judge that the hashes of analyzed files are the same
as the original hashes from an art heist case.
Jordan wins a contract to investigate fraud and decides to certify their
forensics lab.
Jordan uses a script to automate the imaging of a hacked server.
Jordan writes down in his report that a smart home device was used to
coordinate the sale of drugs.
Jordan determines that images on a device use steganography to
convey stolen trade secrets.
Jordan finds a phone at a drug bust and places it into a faraday bag.
Jordan decrypts the stored data on the desktop of a murdered
billionaire.
Jordan locates the wifi connections from a phone collected near
recent graffiti activity.
Jordan collects a drug lord’s phone and hashes its data.
For a theft case, Jordan writes a set of standard procedures for
processing and copying hard drives.
Jordan testifies that the geolocation data of a smart watch matches the
estimated time of death of a murder victim.
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Figure 3.2.2-2: Final Survey Used in the Collection of Data

Survey takers could name any of the groupings how they saw fit. The order or the name
of the groups did not factor into the calculation of surface, deep, or unexpected features.
Allowing the freedom to let survey takers to think creatively as they evaluated the scenarios
based on the instructions:
Combine these scenarios into groups based on your understanding of common digital
forensics principles.
All situations and their corresponding categories are listed below in Table 3.2.2-3: Final Edit of
Proposed Situations. Each situation in the table is listed in order presented on the survey. The
listed surface features and deep features are included for this report but were not present on the
survey itself.
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Table 3.2.2-3: Final Edit of Proposed Situations
Surface Feature
Drug Related

Deep Feature
Analysis

Vandalism

Reporting

Murder

Seizure

Drug Related

Preparation

Theft

Acquisition

Fraud
Vandalism

Reporting
Seizure

Fraud

Seizure

Murder

Analysis

Vandalism

Preparation

Fraud

Acquisition

Theft

Seizure

Murder

Preparation

Fraud

Analysis

Theft

Reporting

Fraud

Preparation

Vandalism

Acquisition

Drug Related

Reporting

Theft

Analysis

Drug Related
Murder

Seizure
Acquisition

Vandalism

Analysis

Drug Related

Acquisition

Theft

Preparation

Murder

Reporting

Situation
Jordan looks through texts from a seized phone searching for
evidence of drug meetups.
Jordan summarizes the important information about a hacked web
page for technical and non-technical audiences.
Jordan enters information about a phone found at a murder scene in a
chain of custody form.
Jordan buys supplies such as faraday bags to be able to store devices
for an upcoming drug raid.
Jordan uses a write blocker to copy a hard drive brought to the
forensics lab from a robbery case.
Jordan writes an assessment about data related to a bank fraud.
Jordan captures the router connected to a hacker’s computer that
vandalized a website.
Jordan searches for all digital devices that employees used to scam
bank customers.
Jordan uses file carving to investigate a murder suspect’s computer.
Jordan learns hacking methods in preparation to access data on a
graffiti artist’s device.
Jordan jail breaks devices to obtain data that may have been used by
money launderers.
Jordan takes a photo at a crime scene of a hard drive that contains
stolen company secrets
Jordan reads newly released legal proceedings from a murder case
that used digital forensics.
Jordan identifies discrepancies in the financial books and data from a
bank’s server logs.
Jordan shows the judge that the hashes of analyzed files are the same
as the original hashes from an art heist case.
Jordan wins a contract to investigate fraud and decides to certify their
forensics lab.
Jordan uses a script to automate the imaging of a seized web server
containing a defaced website.
Jordan writes down in his report that a smart home device was used to
coordinate the sale of drugs.
Jordan determines that images on a device use steganography to
convey stolen trade secrets.
Jordan finds a phone at a drug bust and places it into a faraday bag.
Jordan uses a decryption algorithm to recover lost data on the desktop
of a murdered billionaire.
Jordan constructs a map of the location history of a phone recovered
near a defaced public building.
Jordan hashes the data from a drug lord’s phone checked out from an
evidence locker.
Jordan writes a set of standard procedures for processing and copying
hard drives during a theft case.
Jordan testifies that the geolocation data of a smart watch matches the
estimated time of death of a murder victim.
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Collection of Data
The assessment was then tested against self-proclaimed professionals with computer
forensics experience and a group of students that were in the process of taking a college level
computer forensics class. The assessment was hosted on Qualtrics and was available for
approximately a period of 4 weeks and over 200 results were submitted.
Students that were taking the class were offered a small portion of extra credit to take the
survey. With that incentive, thirty of them participated in the assessment. Professionals were
offered an incentive of winning a twenty-five dollar gift card to Amazon.
To reach the professionals, a survey link was posted on LinkedIn by a certified computer
forensics professional asking other computer forensics professionals to participate in the survey.
While the student’s data was returned in an acceptable manner, some work was needed to clean
up the professionals’ data.
Unfortunately, due to the link being distributed on LinkedIn, it appears that some web
crawling bots designed to take surveys were able to submit responses. There were over a hundred
responses that had improbable answers to questions. For example, some had answered that they
had more years of computer forensics experience than how many years they had existed. Others
submitted that they had years of experience longer than the field of computer forensics has been
around. Other responses indicated that they had started computer forensics as children under the
age of 18. In an effort to standardize and remove inaccurate data, any response that where the
years of experience exceeded the age of the responder or put them under the age of 17 were
eliminated from the responses. This reduced the number of professional survey results from 200
to 109, which was a still a significant number to consider.
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4

ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK

Analysis
Using Qualtrics as a base for collecting the data, the results were downloaded into a csv
format. The responses were then reformatted using a python script to extract the data, organize
the situations and put each situation into the category they believed it should be in. It put each
answer into a format that the algorithm was able to use to calculate the surface, deep and
unexpected features.
The algorithm was then adjusted to the specifics of the survey. It determined surface, deep,
and unexpected features, correlating each given situation with its surface feature and deep
feature. Running the answers against the algorithm provided some statistics that could be
visually graphed to show the general understanding of professionals versus the students.
Programmatically, the algorithm would look akin to a function like this. The algorithm
would compare the given situation and look for a surface, deep or unexpected feature.
If Situation A = x:
If x == B then result = unexpected
If x == C then result = unexpected
If x == D then result = surface
If x == E then result = unexpected
If x == F then result = unexpected
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If x == G then result = unexpected
If x == H then result = unexpected
If x == I then result = deep
Running the results through the algorithm produced the following results. Students were
able to group their results by deep features on average 45.68% of the time with a 11.39%
standard deviation. This is an exceptionally high rate compared to their surface feature mean of
10.14% with a standard deviation of 3.77%. These results show that the students had a decent
understanding of the underlying principles of the situations and were not distracted by the
surface feature parts of each scenario. Even though almost of their responses were unexpected
correlations, they fared much better than the professionals.
Professionals had a much lower deep feature rate as the results showed that only 10.67% of
their solutions had a related deep feature with a 5.99% standard deviation of the mean. Their
surface feature correlation was only slightly higher at 12.45% with a 9.83% standard deviation.
That meant that almost 80% of their responses had unexpected features in their groupings.
Professionals did not seem to understand the underlying principles of each situation and grouped
them in unexpected ways.
These results are depicted visually in Figure 4.1 where the results can be seen between the
two groups. It was expected that professionals would have the least amount of surface features
and unexpected results due to their time, training, and experience in the field. According to the
sources in the literature review, professionals would have been able to identify the deep features
of each scenario on a more consistent basis.
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The unexpected features had much higher score than what was originally anticipated. This
is an interesting data point as it was assumed that the most apparent features in scenarios was the
stage the scenario took place in and the type of crime that was involved.

Figure 4.1: Graph of Deep, Surface, and Unexpected Features of Each Study Group
Limitations
There were some limitations that hindered the survey. The first being that the survey was
published to professionals on LinkedIn without regard to who could take it. LinkedIn is an open
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social media platform where there are no limitations on who can join it. Evidence of this was
shown in that nearly one hundred bots or fake surveys were completed and submitted. This was
also shown in most of the surveys taken in the very low deep feature grouping rate.
A second factor is that survey takers had to be trusted implicitly when stating the amount
of computer forensics experience they had acquired. There was no true measure that could be
enforced or implemented. One’s personal view of their skills, abilities, knowledge of computer
forensics may be skewed to actual true skill they may possess. More data than can be collected
and used in evaluation would be the certifications a professional may hold and the grade that a
student had earned in a computer forensics course and compare those to the amount of surface,
deep, and unexpected features the individual creates.
Another factor could be that individuals were motivated to complete the survey only for a
chance to receive the Amazon gift card. They could not have any computer forensics experience
and just wanted the gift card.
It could also be that once professionals transition to working in the field, they are beset
with daily tasks and that is their primary focus. This survey could be attuned towards academic
learning and points of view and because professionals focus on completing tasks related to their
employment, they may not immediately think of the big picture.

Discussion
Although the results were not what was predicted, there were still valuable results that
were produced from this study. The original question was, “Can it be determined if a
professional has more conceptual expertise than students by grouping like scenarios into the
phase of computer forensics the scenario is performed in?” After performing the study, it seems
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clear that professionals are more focused on tasks related to the job rather than a big picture
scenario. This disproves the original hypothesis and raises some interesting questions.
Students that had the knowledge fresh in their minds from taking a class were able to
show conceptual expertise in understanding the basic principles of computer forensics. They
were able to show that the knowledge, skills, and areas of computer forensics they learned in a
classroom setting and demonstrated their understanding in the different tasks laid out in each
situation. Nearly half of their groupings contained similar deep features while only 10% of their
groupings contained surface features. Coursework included introduction to different forensics
tools, mock investigations, and introduction to the different the computer forensics stages and
processes. Just under half of the student participants were able to use the skills, knowledge, and
abilities to identify the tasks and what was required by the computer forensics professional in
each of the situations.
Since novices were able to identify the deep features nearly 45% of the time, it was
expected that professionals would have a similar or higher identification of deep features due to
their experience, knowledge of the subject matter, and expertise. The low grouping rate,
however, proves a different story.
Professionals who took the survey did not seem to understand the purpose of it. Due to
the low percentage of grouped surface and deep features of approximately 10% each, their
groupings seemed to be much more random. It seems that a majority of the “professionals” who
had taken the survey did not have a solid understanding of computer forensics and the principles
behind why each situation was performed. Citing one of the survey results from a professional
computer forensics expert, they were observed to have grouped the situations by surface level
features. If asked explicitly what the five stages of computer forensics were, they would have
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been able to answer that question correctly and elaborate on each stage. The ambiguity of the
survey seemed to throw most professionals off, much like the survey had seen some incoherence
of computer forensics phases during the initial stages of the survey building process.
It is possible that professionals did not take their time during the survey to assess each
situation. As mentioned previously, many computer forensics individuals have backlogs of tasks
and work on their plates. They may have done the survey quickly to participate in it and then
move on. The amount of time taken to complete the survey was not measured and so that could
not be evaluated if that was a possible reason or not.
When Giboney performed his study on evaluating the conceptual expertise of hackers, he
had referenced that individuals can often have a bias towards their own skills, abilities, and areas
of knowledge (Giboney et al., 2016). It is also possible this was the case in this study as the
survey was open to an indeterminate amount and unfocused group of participants. Individuals
could have had a loftier and inflated view of their computer forensics skills and classified
themselves as professionals to take the survey. Their lack of knowledge of the core principles of
computer forensics could be a main reason why the professional group scored poorly.
Many people learn cybersecurity from personal efforts rather than an organized
educational setting. One major source of learning is do-it-yourself courses and tasks hosted on
the internet or through online videos hosted on platforms such as YouTube. This type of learning
tends to focus on doing specific tasks and being able to complete objectives rather than learning
underlying principles. Professionals who learned and entered the field this way would complete
all the tasks required of a computer forensics analyst proficiently but not understand the
foundational principles behind the tasks.
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Some interesting future iterations of this work would concentrate on getting more focused
data set of professionals rather than an open survey on the internet. A more focused method of
obtaining professional data would be to solicit participation from digital forensic firms and
corporations. They require their employees to be proficient, competent and perform all the daily
tasks clients would require of them. If employees from these types of businesses would
participate, it would eliminate much of the uncertainty of the level of expertise professionals had
in this study. One can compare the results of that study with this study and can more accurately
tell if professionals really do focus more on tasks than big picture principles.
Future work could also evaluate the names of the groupings that professionals use to see if
they saw more complex connections between the scenario. For example, this survey would be
useful in an interview and be a discussion point between an employer and a job candidate to
understand the way that they think.

Conclusion
This research aimed to identify what knowledge, skills, tasks, and abilities can
demonstrate conceptual expertise of computer forensics. The survey results have shown that the
ability that individuals have to evaluate tasks, place them into groups based on surface features
and deep features requires knowledge and skill of computer forensics. The tasks selected are
fundamental in a computer forensics professional’s daily work and a basic knowledge of the
underlying computer forensics phases can help determine whether or not an individual
comprehends them.
This study has promise to help individuals evaluate whether a professional knows the
basics of computer forensics principles. While not being able to identify the exact skills,
knowledge, and expertise an individual may have regarding the different stages of computer
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forensics. Surveys like this could be used in job interviews, establishing expertise for a court
case, or even evaluating students’ learning in a computer forensics class. Furthermore, this study
has confirmed that because an individual can claim to be a professional in a field, it does not
mean they understand the basic phases of computer forensics.
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